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Abstract: EU law has significant influence on the Internet and parties outside the EU’s 
territorial boundaries that use it and are affected by it. The Internet has enabled the EU to 
extend to third countries the application of its fundamental values, including the autonomy of 
EU law, the rule of law, and fundamental rights. There are many examples of the EU exerting 
its global reach regarding the Internet, particularly in data protection law, but also in areas such 
as Internet governance, international agreements, and private international law. This occurs 
through a variety of mechanisms, including emulation and learning; international negotiation; 
coercion and conditionality; and blocking recognition of third country legal measures. The 
EU’s actions in exercising its global reach implicate important normative issues, such as 
distinguishing between the furtherance of core EU legal values and the advancement of the 
EU’s political interests; promoting the principles of EU law as universal values; ensuring that 
EU legal values are upheld in practice; and determining the territorial boundaries of EU law. 
The influence exercised by the EU carries responsibilities towards third countries, particularly 
those in the developing world. The Internet may also be influencing EU law, as is shown by 
the changing role of the Court of Justice. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Since becoming available for widespread use in the mid 1990s, the Internet has 
‘contributed to a shrinking of the world and to an interconnectedness of legal 
orders that has never been as intense in legal history’.1 During the same period, 
EU law has become a normative power that exerts its influence over a variety of 
phenomena,2 including the Internet.  
The relationship between EU law and the Internet is one of mutual influence. 
On the one hand, EU law has influenced the development of the Internet, and 
impacted countries and parties outside the EU’s borders. On the other hand, the 
Internet raises important questions about the application, scope, and normative 
values of EU law. In many ways the Internet is the ideal vehicle for examining the 
ambitions of EU law in an increasingly complex and globalized world. 
The Internet functions based on technical protocols rather than legal rules. It 
was established as a distributed network not under the control of a sole country or 
government,3 and operates based on open standards that allow networks around 
the world to connect with each other. The Internet also makes it possible for 
anyone to create content or offer products and services without permission from a 
central authority. This open, independent structure has been one of the keys to its 
success.  
However, these same factors complicate the relationship between EU law 
and the Internet. The Internet is not an enterprise, public authority, product, 
technology, or other entity or institution of the type that is normally the subject of 
influence by EU law. Furthermore, instruments of ‘soft law’ (for example, 
contractual arrangements between private parties) play a crucial role in the way the 
Internet is used.4 This demonstrates how the governance and regulation of the 
Internet can be regarded as an example of pluralism and global legal hybridity.5 
This chapter will examine the influence that EU law has over the Internet and 
                                                      
1 J. Basedow, ‘The Law of Open Societies—Private Ordering and Public Regulation of International 
Relations’, 360 Recueil des cours/Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law (2012) 9, at 471. 
2 Some of the leading scholarly examinations of this topic include Bradford, ‘The Brussels Effect’, 107 
Northwestern University Law Review (2013) 1; Gilardi, ‘Transnational diffusion: Norms, ideas, and policies’, in 
W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse, and B. Simmons (eds) (2012), Handbook of International Relations (2012) 453, 
<http://www.fabriziogilardi.org/resources/papers/gilardi_handbook_IR_v2.pdf> (last visited 12 
November 2016); Scott, ‘Extraterritoriality and Territorial Extension in EU Law’ 62 American Journal of 
Comparative Law (2014) 87; Scott, ‘The New Extraterritoriality’ 51 Common Market Law Review (2014) 1343; 
De Witte and Thies, ‘Why Choose Europe? The Place of the European Union in the Architecture of 
International Legal Cooperation’, in B. Van Vooren, S. Blockmans and J. Wouters (eds), The EU’s Role in 
Global Governance (2013) 23; Young, ‘The European Union as a Global Regulator? Context and 
Comparison’, 22 Journal of European Public Policy (2015) 1233. 
3 For a brief description of the Internet, what it is, and how it operates, see Internet Society, ‘The 
Internet: How it Works’, <https://www.internetsociety.org/internet/how-it-works> (last visited 23 
October 2016). 
4 See L. Bygrave, Internet Governance by Contract (2015), at 6 (Kindle edition); C. Marsden, Internet Co-
Regulation (2011). 
5 See P. Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism (2012), at 177-178 (Kindle edition). 
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parties outside the EU’s territorial boundaries that use and are affected by it. The 
global reach of EU law is manifested in different types of actions taken by the EU 
and its Member States, such as asserting EU values and interests in international 
organisations and the conclusion of international treaties; influencing the adoption 
of legislation in third countries; requiring compliance with EU legal standards 
outside its borders; and undertaking regulatory investigations in third countries.  
It will also deal with the interaction between the underlying values of EU law and 
the Internet, i.e., situations when these values apply to the Internet and produce 
effects outside the EU. The extension of EU values to the Internet has been made 
possible by the evolution of EU law in recent years through the adoption of the 
Treaty of Lisbon6 and the elevation of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights7 to 
the level of binding primary law.8 In exerting its global reach, the EU increasingly 
attempts to promote its legal values as universal values. 
The Internet also presents EU law with important challenges. Because of the 
fragmented and global nature of Internet governance and regulation, much activity 
conducted on it is not subject to the direct control of EU law. The relationship 
between the EU institutions and the Member States also plays an important role in 
determining the limits and efficacy of EU action regarding the Internet.  
An examination of the interaction between EU law and the Internet raises a 
number of important normative questions, such as regarding the interrelationship 
between EU legal values and the EU’s political or policy interests; the implications 
of asserting EU values as universal values; how to ensure that EU values apply to 
the Internet in practice as well as in theory; whether there are territorial limits to 
the application of EU law; and what responsibilities EU law has towards the third 
countries that it influences, particularly those in the developing world. It also 
seems that, just as EU law influences the Internet, the Internet may be changing 
EU law. 
 
 
 
2. THE NATURE OF THE INTERNET AND ITS GOVERNANCE 
 
A. WHAT IS THE INTERNET? 
 
Defining the Internet is more difficult than it might seem at first glance. The 
definition articulated in 1995 by the US Federal Networking Council (FNC) is 
often cited: 
 
‘Internet’ refers to the global information system that (i) is logically linked 
                                                      
6 Treaty of Lisbon, OJ 2007 C 306/1. 
7 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ 2010 C83/389. 
8 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), OJ 2012 C326/13, at Art. 6(1). 
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together by a globally unique address space based on the Internet Protocol 
(IP) or its subsequent extensions/ follow-ons; (ii) is able to support 
communications using the Transmission Control Protocol / Internet 
Protocol (TCP/IP) suite or its subsequent extensions/ follow-ons, and/ or 
other IP-compatible protocols; and (iii) provides, uses, or makes accessible, 
either publicly or privately, high level services layered on the communications 
and related infrastructure described herein.9 
 
This definition focuses on the Internet’s use of the TCP/IP suite10 in order to 
differentiate it from other networks. However, the Internet is much more than a 
single technical protocol. Nowadays, different networks may be connected to 
transfer data at least in part via the Internet, not all of which employ TCP/IP.11 
The term ‘Internet’ is often used not just in relation to a particular protocol or 
technology, but to refer to the interconnection of electronic communications 
networks around the world, including the technical infrastructure that they use. 
Because Internet technologies and their use change so quickly, it seems best to 
adopt a broad definition that includes not only networks that run based on 
TCP/IP, but the global communications infrastructure that underlies the 
Internet.12 Understood in this way, the Internet can be defined to include the 
broad range of infrastructure, content, applications, hardware, and other 
phenomenon that determines both the purpose of the Internet, and how it 
operates in practice.13 Thus, the Internet will be considered here to constitute the 
‘network of networks’ that includes the totality of global communications 
networks, infrastructure, and content that are connected to it and transmitted on 
it.  
 
B. HOW IS THE INTERNET GOVERNED? 
 
The Internet functions based on a multi-layered governance model, as illustrated 
by the following chart:14 
                                                      
9 FNC Resolution of 24 October 1995, <https://www.nitrd.gov/fnc/Internet_res.aspx> (last visited 22 
October 2016). 
10 The TCP/IP suite is a set of communications protocols widely used to transmit data packets on the 
Internet. See <http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/52614/tcp-ip> (last visited 22 January 
2017). 
11 For a discussion of the factors involved in defining what constitutes the Internet, see Bygrave, supra 
note 4, at 14-17 (Kindle edition). 
12 Ibid., at 15 (Kindle edition). 
13 L.B. Solum, ‘Models of Internet Governance’, in L. Bygrave and J. Bing (eds), Internet Governance: 
Infrastructure and Institutions (2009) 48, at 48–9, stating that ‘In the broad sense, the Internet is a complex 
entity that includes the hardware and software technical infrastructure, the applications, and the content 
that is communicated or generated using those applications’. 
14 The chart is adapted from Cerf, Ryan, and Senges, ‘Internet Governance is our Shared Responsibility’, 
10 I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society (2014) 1, at 10. The bullet points included in 
each layer are exemplary rather than exhaustive. 
  
Christopher Kuner              The Internet and the Global Reach of EU Law 
 
 
 5 
Social Layer 
• Trust and identity 
• Human rights applied to the Internet 
• Internet governance principles (e.g. net neutrality) 
Content Layer 
• Data protection 
• Intellectual property rights 
• Cybercrime 
• SPAM 
Logical Layer 
• Internet naming and numbering 
• Protocols & other standards 
Infrastructure Layer 
• Connectivity & universal access 
 
In this model, the infrastructure layer comprises the networks through which data 
travels on the Internet; the logical layer contains the code and mechanisms by 
which the Internet operates; the content layer contains the information that is 
transmitted through it and the legal rules that govern such information; and the 
social layer deals with ‘practices that define paramount rights and principles 
associated with ‘social conduct’ online’15. This chapter will mainly be concerned 
with the third and fourth layers (i.e., the content and social layers), though EU law 
may impact all four. 
The primary instruments of EU law do not explicitly mention the Internet. 
However, the various layers of governance set forth above are subject to 
regulation by the EU insofar as there is EU law in the respective area; for example, 
telecommunications networks are subject to telecommunications regulation, and 
intellectual property and data protection are affected by those areas of regulation.  
The fragmented governance structure of the Internet limits the ability of EU to 
exert control over it. The Internet is accessible globally, and most of the 
infrastructure on which it runs, the organizations that maintain it, and the 
individuals that use it are located outside the EU. Moreover, as a global 
communications infrastructure the Internet is of interest to countries all over the 
world, which may exercise their own legal and regulatory power over it, potentially 
leading to legal conflicts.  
A number of international entities and organisations play an important role in 
the functioning and governance of the Internet. In 2006, the United Nations 
Secretary-General established the Internet Governance Forum (IGF), a forum for 
dialogue on all issues of policy related to Internet governance that includes 
participation from stakeholders in all sectors, including governments, the private 
                                                      
15 Ibid., at 9. 
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sector, civil society, academia, and the technical community.16 Several 
organisations also play a crucial role in setting technical standards for the Internet, 
such as the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF),17 the World Wide Web 
Consortium (W3C),18 and the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers (ICANN),19 none of which are ‘regulators’ in the sense of being public 
authorities mandated with enforcing a set of laws or legal rules.  
The growing social, economic, and political importance of the Internet has 
led to its increased regulation in all regions of the world,20 which frequently causes 
difficulties in application and enforcement of the law. The difficulty of applying 
and enforcing any regulatory system (not just EU law) to the Internet rests on the 
fact that its operation involves a highly fragmented universe of actors, norms, 
procedures, processes, and institutions, including many non-state entities (such as 
private companies, non-governmental organisations, academic institutions, 
standards organisations, and others). Their activities have resulted in the adoption 
of contracts, technical standards, guidelines, and best practices that differ from 
legislation and legal regulation traditionally enacted by governments, but that still 
have had a profound effect on how the Internet functions: 
 
[T]he governance structure for the Internet has been formed largely outside 
a treaty or other legislative framework that is Internet-specific. Contracts 
provide the legal bricks and mortar for much of the present structure, and 
they do so often without a direct basis in legislation. Concomitantly, the 
governance structure is relatively unencumbered by dirigiste ideology and 
has permitted a fairly high degree of self-regulation. While tentacles of 
government control are increasingly visible, private sector bodies have 
usually been allowed—and often encouraged—to lead the design and 
management of the Internet. Governments have acted more as facilitative 
partners of these bodies than as heavy-handed regulators, at least in Western 
democracies. In other words, governance has been exercised to a large 
degree by contractually based, co-operative networks rather than decree.21 
 
It is often difficult to determine the place where an action on the Internet takes 
place, or where the actor that initiated or completed it is located. Jurisdictional 
rules in many legal systems are based on the principle of territoriality, i.e., that 
                                                      
16 See <http://www.intgovforum.org/multilingual/> (last visited 23 October 2016). 
17 See <http://www.ietf.org> (last visited 23 October 2016). 
18 See <https://www.w3.org> (last visited 23 October 2016). 
19 See <https://www.icann.org> (last visited 23 October 2016). 
20 See J. Goldsmith and T. Wu, Who Controls the Internet? Illusions of a Borderless World (2008); Schiff Berman, 
supra note 5, at 28-29 (Kindle edition), stating that countries around the world have enacted ‘laws 
purporting to regulate almost every conceivable online activity, from gambling to chat rooms to auction 
sites, and seeking to enforce territorially based rules regarding trademarks, contractual relations, privacy 
norms, “indecent” content, and crime, among others’. 
21 Bygrave, supra note 4, at 2 (Kindle edition). 
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 7 
jurisdiction obtains over acts committed within the territory of the country in 
question.22 However, the Internet complicates application of the territoriality 
principle, since it can be difficult to localize an online action as occurring in a 
particular country.23 This leads to uncertainty as to which law applies or which 
legal system has jurisdiction over Internet-related activities, which is reflected in 
the challenges that the Internet presents to EU law.  
 
 
 
3. THE EU AND THE MEMBER STATES 
 
Both the EU and the Member States are active in law and policy regarding 
Internet issues, and the relationship between the two helps determine the scope of 
EU law concerning the Internet. 
At the EU level, the making of law and policy concerning the Internet is 
fragmented among the institutions. To give a few examples, in the European 
Commission different Directorates-General take the lead in work on Internet 
issues such as net neutrality,24 data protection,25 and intellectual property rights.26 
Other EU institutions, such as the European Economic and Society Committee27 
and the European Parliament,28 are also deeply involved in Internet issues. There 
are Internet-related initiatives pursued jointly by various EU institutions; an 
example is the Communication concerning the ‘Cybersecurity Strategy of the 
European Union’,29 which was published jointly in 2013 by the European 
Commission and the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy (the ‘High Representative’). As discussed throughout this chapter, 
there are also numerous legislative initiatives in the EU and judgments of the 
Court of Justice dealing with the Internet. While it is not an EU institution, the 
European Court of Human Rights has issued numerous judgments concerning the 
                                                      
22 See, e.g., C. Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in International Law (2nd ed., 2015), at 49 (Kindle edition). 
23 See, e.g., Michaels, ‘Territorial jurisdiction after territoriality’ in: P. J. Slot and M. Bulterman (eds.), 
Globalisation and Jurisdiction (2004) 105, at 106. 
24 See <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/open-internet-net-neutrality> (last visited 10 
December 2016), work on which is led by DG CONNECT. 
25 See <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/international-transfers/index_en.htm> (last visited 
10 December 2016), work on which is led by DG JUST. 
26 See <https://ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/intellectual-property_en> (last visited 10 December 
2016), work on which is led by DG GROW. 
27 See <http://www.eesc.europa.eu/?i=portal.en.information-society> (last visited 10 December 2016). 
28 See, e.g., the work of the European Parliament Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/libe/home.html> (last visited 10 December 2016). 
29 European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy, ‘Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: 
An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace’, JOIN(2013) 1 final, 7 February 2013, 
<http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=1667> (last visited 18 November 2016). 
See Schaake and Vermeulen, ‘Towards a values-based European foreign policy to cybersecurity’, 1 Journal 
of Cyber Policy (2016) 75. 
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Internet.30 
The Member States exercise influence through the Council’s role in enacting 
EU law and policy (for example, the Council is tasked with identifying the EU’s 
‘strategic interests’ in the context of external action31). In addition, Member States 
pursue their own legal and regulatory initiatives dealing with the Internet. A few 
examples include the ‘Digitale-Agenda 2014-2017’ of the German Federal 
Government,32 the ‘Agenda Digitale Italiana’ of the Italian government,33 and the 
‘Digitales Österreich’ initiative of the Austrian government.34 Legislatures, courts, 
and regulators in all Member States have been active in issues concerning the 
Internet. 
Shared competence between the EU and the Member States is the general 
rule,35 and the Internet is not mentioned in Article 3 TFEU that lists the Union’s 
exclusive competences, so it is an area of shared competence. This conclusion is 
supported by the fact that some areas listed in Article 4(2) TFEU as examples of 
shared competence are particularly important with regard to the Internet, such as 
the internal market and consumer protection. This means that international 
agreements concluded by the EU concerning the Internet tend to be ‘mixed’ 
agreements that must be entered into by both the EU and the Member States.36 
However, certain areas of EU law related to the Internet may fall primarily 
within the competence of the EU, as can be seen by the example of data 
protection. The Member States may act with regard to areas of shared competence 
only to the extent that the EU has not done so,37 and data protection, which the 
EU first regulated on a horizontal basis in Directive 95/46/EC,38 has now been 
harmonised via Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (the ‘GDPR’) that will become 
                                                      
30 See European Court of Human Rights, Research Division, ‘Internet: case-law of the European Court 
of Human Rights, Updated: 2015’, 
<http://www.echr.coe.int/documents/research_report_internet_eng.pdf> (last visited 10 December 
2016). 
31 TEU, supra note 8, at Art. 26(1). See P. Eeckhout, EU External Relations Law (2011), at 485-486 (Kindle 
edition). 
32 See <https://www.digitale-agenda.de/Webs/DA/DE/Home/home_node.html> (last visited 10 
December 2016). 
33 See <http://www.agid.gov.it/agenda-digitale/agenda-digitale-italiana> (last visited 10 December 
2016).   
34 See <https://www.digitales.oesterreich.gv.at> (last visited 10 December 2016). 
35 See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), OJ 2012 
C 326/47, at Art. 4(1); A. Rosas and L. Armati, EU Constitutional Law: An Introduction (2012), at 23 (Kindle 
edition). 
36 For example, the United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in 
International Contracts 2005, 2898 UNTS, Registration No. 50525, can be regarded as a mixed 
agreement. See Killian, ‘The Electronic Communications Convention: A European Union Perspective’, in 
A.H. Boss and W. Killian, The United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International 
Contracts: An In-Depth Guide and Sourcebook (2008) 407, at 414.  
37 TFEU, supra note 35, at Art. 2(2). See Rosas and Armati, supra note 35, at 246 (Kindle edition). 
38 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data, OJ 1995 L281/31. 
  
Christopher Kuner              The Internet and the Global Reach of EU Law 
 
 
 9 
applicable on 25 May 2018.39 The new Regulation on Privacy and Electronic 
Communications40 (the ‘ePrivacy Regulation’) proposed by the Commission in 
January 2017 would also result in harmonisation of data protection issues related 
to the Internet. This harmonisation means that the EU has more or less exclusive 
competence concerning data protection with regard to issues that fall within the 
scope of the harmonising legislation. In addition, the Member States may not 
undertake obligations with third countries that affect common rules laid down by 
the EU,41 a principle that the GDPR affirms with regard to data protection,42 
suggesting that, in practice, the conclusion of international agreements concerning 
data protection also lies exclusively in the competence of the EU.43 There are also 
limits on the ability of the Member States to participate in law-making initiatives in 
international fora even in the absence of exclusive competence of the EU,44 in 
light of the duty of sincere cooperation that applies in cases of shared 
competence.45 
With regard to the negotiation of international treaties relating to the 
Internet, in most cases the Commission should negotiate on behalf of the EU 
after being nominated by the Council,46 except for treaties relating exclusively or 
principally to the Common Foreign and Security Policy, which should be 
negotiated by the High Representative.47 This latter case would apply in an area 
such as cybersecurity insofar as it relates to defence, as this would seem to fall 
under the Common Security and Defence Policy,48 which is an integral part of the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy.49 
Of course, many important discussions between governments, countries, and 
other stakeholders take place in the work of institutions that do not focus solely 
on the conclusion of legally-binding agreements. Both the EU and the Member 
States are active on the international stage with regard to Internet issues, and both 
                                                      
39 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), OJ 2016 L119/1. 
40 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the respect for 
private life and the protection of personal data in electronic communications and repealing Directive 
2002/58/EC (Regulation on Privacy and Electronic Communications), COM(2017) 10 final, 10 January 
2017. 
41 See Case 22/70, Commission v. Council (AETR/ERTA), [1971] ECR 263 (ECLI:EU:C:1971:32). See also 
Eeckhout, supra note 46, at 71-76 (Kindle edition). 
42 See GDPR, supra note 39, at Recital 102, stating ‘Member States may conclude international agreements 
which involve the transfer of personal data to third countries or international organisations, as far as such 
agreements do not affect this Regulation or any other provisions of Union law and include an appropriate 
level of protection for the fundamental rights of the data subjects.’ 
43 See H. Hijmans, The European Union as Guardian of Internet Privacy: The Story of Art 16 TFEU (2016), at 
468-470. 
44 See De Witte and Thies, supra note 2, at 32-33. 
45 See TEU, supra note 8, at Art. 4(3). 
46 See TFEU, supra note 35, at Art. 218(3); Eeckhout, supra note 46, at 195-196 (Kindle edition). 
47 Ibid. 
48 See P. Koutrakos, The EU Common Security and Defense Policy (2013), at 85 (Kindle edition). See also 
Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union, supra note 29, at 11-12. 
49 TEU, supra note 8, at Art. 42(1). 
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participate in the work of international organisations such as the Council of 
Europe, the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development 
(OECD), various UN agencies, standards-setting bodies, entities dealing with 
Internet governance, and others.  
The relationship between the EU and its Member States with regard to the 
Internet is marked by both cooperation and tension. On the one hand, the EU 
seems to favour cooperation with regard to Internet issues on the part of the 
various EU institutions and the Member States. This can be seen in the European 
Commission’s 2014 Communication on Internet governance, where it is stated 
that ‘The Commission invites the Council and Parliament, the Economic and 
Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions, as well as Member States, to 
agree on a common vision as highlighted in this Communication and to defend it 
jointly in the forthcoming international debates’.50 
At the same time, the division of competences between the EU and the 
Member States regarding the Internet can lead to disputes between them. For 
example, during negotiation of the Directive on Electronic Signatures,51 the 
German government sought to have it cover only digital signatures using 
asymmetric cryptography (as were covered in the original version of the German 
Digital Signatures Act52), and not the broader category of electronic signatures,53 
which led to a dispute between Germany and the Commission as to the scope of 
the Directive. There were also numerous disputes between the Member States and 
the European Commission during the drafting and enactment of the GDPR about 
its contents, scope, and other issues.54  
I have witnessed this tension first-hand in international organisations such as 
the Council of Europe in its modernisation of Convention 108,55 and the United 
Nations Commission for International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) in its work 
                                                      
50 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, ‘Internet Policy and Governance: 
Europe's role in shaping the future of Internet Governance’, COM/2014/072 final, 12 February 2014, 
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52014DC0072&from=EN> 
(last visited 27 October 2016). 
51 Directive 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 1999 on a 
Community Framework for Electronic Signatures, OJ 2000 L13/12. 
52 Signaturgesetz vom l. August 1997 (BGBl. I S. 1870, 1872), amended by Signaturgesetz vom 16. Mai 2001 
(BGBl. I S. 876) and Artikel 4 des Gesetzes vom 17. Juli 2009 (BGBl. I S. 2091). 
53 See Bundesregierung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, ‘Anmerkungen der Bundesregierung zu dem 
Entwurf der Europäischen Kommission einer EG-Richtlinie über elektronische bzw. Digitale 
Signaturen’, 8 April 1998, at 1. 
54 See Burton, De Boel, Kuner, Pateraki, Cadiot, and Hoffman, ‘The Final European Union General Data 
Protection Regulation’, 15 Bloomberg BNA Privacy and Security Law Report (2016) 153. 
55 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, 
opened for signature on 28 January 1981, in force 1 October 1985, ETS 108. Regarding the work of the 
Council of Europe to modernise the Convention, see 
<http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/dataprotection/modernisation_en.asp> (last visited 17 
November 2016). 
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concerning both the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures56 and the 
United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in 
International Contracts57 (hereinafter the UNCITRAL Convention on Electronic 
Communications). Disputes have tended to arise in this regard between the 
European Commission and the Member States when both were participating in 
the work of one of the relevant international organisations and the Commission 
asserted its right to negotiate on behalf of the EU regarding a matter that was the 
subject of present or pending EU legislation. When such disputes about 
competence break into the open in the work of international organisations, it 
weakens the influence of EU law by putting cooperation between the EU 
institutions and the Member States in a bad light and allowing third counties to 
assert themselves at the expenses of a disunited EU. 
 
 
 
4. THE INTERNET AND THE VALUES OF EU LAW 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 
The EU is an autonomous legal entity based on values, the promotion of which is 
one of its aims,58 and it is obliged to uphold and promote its values and interests 
in its dealings with the wider world.59 The TEU contains a detailed list of 
‘principles’ by which the EU is to be guided on the international scene, including 
‘democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and 
solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and 
international law’.60  
The extension of these values to the global Internet has occurred in 
conjunction with the development of EU law during the last twenty years. One of 
the first times that the EU dealt with Internet legal issues in an international 
context was in the scope of the ministerial conference on ‘Global Information 
Networks’ held in Bonn on 6-8 July 1997,61 which was jointly organised by the 
European Commission and the German government and included representatives 
of the Commission, the Member States, the US government, other third country 
governments, international organisations, and the private sector. The final 
                                                      
56 See 
<http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/electronic_commerce/2001Model_signatures.html
> (last visited 27 October 2016). 
57 See supra note 36. 
58 TEU, supra note 8, at Arts. 2 and 3(1). See also T. Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law (2nd ed. 
2006), at 15, finding that the values of the EU represent the EU legal order. 
59 TEU, supra note 8, at Art. 3(5) and Art. 21(3). 
60 Ibid., at Art. 21(1). See also Hijmans, supra note 43, at 33. 
61 See <http://www.echo.lu/bonn/conference.html> (last visited 24 January2017). 
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‘Ministerial declaration’ published at the conclusion of the conference contained 
hardly any mention of actions to be taken specifically by the EU.62 During the 
next few years, the EU largely focused on Internet-related issues relevant to the 
internal market, through the enactment of instruments such as the Directive on 
Electronic Commerce63 and the Directive on Electronic Signatures.64 It was only 
following entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 and the resultant 
elevation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights to primary law that EU law was 
given the tools to assert its values and interests at a global level regarding the 
Internet,65 as can be seen in the post-Lisbon judgments of the Court of Justice 
which rely on the TEU, the TFEU, and the Charter to assert the global reach of 
EU law. 
In considering the relationship between EU law and the Internet, it is 
important to identify the values, principles, and objectives of EU law that are 
implicated with regard to the Internet. 
 
B. THE AUTONOMY OF EU LAW 
 
EU law views itself as an autonomous legal system,66 which has been interpreted 
to refer to ‘the separateness and autonomy of the EC from other legal systems and 
from the international legal order more generally, and the priority to be given to 
the EC's own fundamental rules’.67 The autonomy of EU law means that EU legal 
rules are to be given priority over other rules in case of conflict, even with regard 
to international agreements.68 
The pluralistic and fragmented nature of the Internet leads to frequent legal 
conflicts and situations where different norms cover the same actors or conduct, 
without the existence of clear rules to determine which has priority. Such 
situations impact the autonomy of EU law, since they may lead to non-EU norms 
prevailing over the fundamental values of EU law, a possibility that the Court of 
Justice has rejected in Internet-related cases.69 
 
 
                                                      
62 See <http://www.echo.lu/bonn/final.html> (last visited 24 January2017). 
63 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal 
aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market, OJ 
2000 L 178/1. 
64 See supra note 51. 
65 See Hijmans, supra note 43. 
66 See, e.g., Opinion 2/13, 18 December 2014, (CLI:EU:C:2014:2454); Joined Cases C-402 & 415/05P, 
Kadi, [2008] ECR 1-6351 (ECLI:EU:C:2008:461). 
67 de Búrca, ‘The European Court of Justice and the International Legal Order After Kadi’, 51 Harvard 
International Law Journal (2010) 1, at 23. 
68 See Kadi, supra note 66, at para. 285. 
69 See Case C-362/14, Schrems, 6 October 2015 (ECLI:EU:C:2015:650), at paras. 84-87, criticising the EU-
US Safe Harbour Arrangement as giving US law primacy over EU fundamental rights in situations where 
they conflict. 
  
Christopher Kuner              The Internet and the Global Reach of EU Law 
 
 
 13 
C. THE RULE OF LAW 
 
The rule of law is one of the values upon which the EU is founded.70 While the 
meaning of the term is open to interpretation,71 it includes requirements such as 
that actions are limited by rules; that such rules are fixed and set in advance; and 
that judicial review and access to courts are available if they are violated.72  
As one of the central values of the EU, the rule of law is a benchmark for 
EU action with respect to third countries, and ‘is undoubtedly a value that the EU 
relentlessly seeks to export “beyond the borders of the Union by means of 
persuasion, incentives and negotiation,” but other more “punishing” means have 
also been used…’73 The Court of Justice has emphasized the need to respect the 
rule of law with regard to data processing on the Internet, as can be seen in its 
Schrems judgment, where it stressed the importance of upholding the rule of law 
with regard to legislation limiting the effective right to judicial protection 
contained in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.74 Thus, upholding 
the rule of law with regard to the Internet is a key concern of EU law, particularly 
as this relates to fundamental rights.75 
 
D. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
 
Fundamental rights are a value upon which the EU is founded,76 and they play a 
key role in the relationship between EU law and the Internet. First of all, the EU 
must promote fundamental rights in its dealings with the wider world, including 
the Internet. Second, fundamental rights place limits on the action that the EU 
may take and oblige it to protect the rights of EU individuals. Fundamental rights 
must be respected whenever EU law applies,77 as the Court of Justice has stressed 
in various judgments dealing with Internet-related issues of data protection,78 
online copyright infringement,79 and the retention of telecommunications data.80  
 
                                                      
70 TEU, supra note 8, at Art. 2. 
71 See Kochenov, ‘The EU Rule of Law: Cutting Paths through Confusion’, 2 Erasmus Law Review (2009) 
5, at 9. 
72 Rosas and Armati, supra note 35, at 46 (Kindle edition). 
73 Pech, ‘Rule of Law as a Guiding Principle in the EU’s External Action’, Centre for the Law of EU 
External Relations, CLEER Working Papers 2012/13, <http://www.asser.nl/media/1632/cleer2012-
3web.pdf> (last visited 28 October 2016), at 13. 
74 See Schrems, supra note 69, at para. 95. 
75 See Hijmans, supra note 43, at 27-31. 
76 See TEU, supra note 8, at Art. 2. See also Art. 6(1) TEU, stating that fundamental rights have the same 
legal value as the Treaties. 
77 See Case 617/10, Åkerberg Fransson, 26 February 2013 (ECLI:EU:C:2013:105), at para. 21. 
78 See, e.g., Schrems, supra note 69; Case C-131/12, Google Spain, 13 May 2014 (ECLI:EU:C:2014:317). 
79 Case C-160/15, GS Media BV, 8 September 2016 (ECLI:EU:C:2016:644), at para. 31. 
80 Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger, Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, 8 April 2014 
(ECLI:EU:C:2014:238); Tele2 Sverige AB, Joined Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15, 21 December 2016 
(ECLI:EU:C:2016:970). 
                           4/2017 
 
 14 
5. INTERACTION BETWEEN EU LAW AND THE INTERNET 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 
Some topics of EU law are by their nature ‘external’, while others are inherently 
‘internal’ but have global reach.81 The Internet merges the distinction between 
these two categories, since ‘in a globalized economy, everything has an effect on 
everything’.82 The discussion herein will thus cover several areas of EU law that 
directly focus on the Internet (such as Internet governance), as well as other ones 
that routinely raise Internet-related issues (such as data protection). This is by 
necessity a selection of a few areas where EU law interacts with the Internet, and 
is not intended to be exhaustive. As this examination will show, the EU exerts its 
influence on Internet-related developments in many areas, including in some cases 
the direct application of EU law to activities in third countries. 
 
B. INTERNET GOVERNANCE 
 
The term ‘Internet governance’ refers not just to the technical management of the 
Internet, but also to law and policy in a host of areas dealing with communication 
and information policy.83 This is reflected in the definition used by the European 
Commission in its 2014 Communication on Internet governance, which defines 
the term broadly and emphasizes its pluralistic nature.84 One of the EU’s main 
objectives in Internet governance is to have the law apply to the Internet just as it 
does to the offline world,85 a view that has also been advocated by the UN Human 
Rights Council.86  
An example of EU action to promote its own values regarding internet 
governance concerns the domain name system (DNS), which functions as a kind 
of address book that translates domain names to Internet protocol addresses so 
that computers connected to the Internet can communicate with each other.87 
Domain name registrars maintain a register of the owners of domain names that 
can be queried online by searching the WHOIS servers, which contain a 
                                                      
81 See Rosas and Armati, supra note 35, at 237 (Kindle edition); Cremona and Micklitz, ‘Introduction’, in 
M. Cremona and H.-W. Micklitz (eds), Private Law in the External Relations of the EU (2016) location 1427, 
at location 1451 (Kindle edition). 
82 Michaels, supra note 23, at 123. 
83 See supra section 2B. 
84 See Communication from the Commission, supra note 50, at 2, stating: ‘Internet governance is broadly 
understood to refer to the development and application by Governments, the private sector and civil 
society, in their respective roles, of shared principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and 
programmes that shape the evolution and use of the Internet’. 
85 Ibid., at 2. 
86 UN Human Rights Council, ‘The promotion, protection, and enjoyment of human rights on the 
Internet’ (29 June 2012), UN Doc A/HRC/20L.13, at 2, stating that ‘the same rights that people have 
offline must also be protected online…’. 
87 See <http://www.internetsociety.org/dns> (last visited 27 December 2016). 
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substantial amount of data about registered domains, their registrants, and the 
servers used. Placing this data to be searched on the Internet via the WHOIS 
protocol clashes with EU data protection law,88 which has led to criticism of the 
WHOIS system by the body of EU and Member State data protection authorities 
(called the Article 29 Working Party).89 These criticisms have resulted in ICANN 
granting waivers in some cases to domain name registrars in the EU with regard to 
the conditions for data access and retention contained in the Registrar 
Accreditation Agreement (RAA) that controls how registrars store and make 
available WHOIS data, in order to allow them to take EU data protection 
requirements into account.90  
The EU institutions may cooperate with other entities to assert the values of 
EU law in Internet governance. For example, the Communication published 
jointly by the European Commission and the High Representative of the EU for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Communication in 2013 concerning the 
‘Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union’91 urges that the EU develop ‘a 
coherent international cyberspace policy’ that promotes ‘EU core values’ in 
cooperation with ‘relevant international partners and organisations, the private 
sector and civil society’, and that this be mainstreamed into EU external relations 
and the Common Foreign and Security Policy.92 
 
C. DATA PROTECTION 
 
Data protection law, which subjects the processing of personal data to a set of 
defined rules in order to protect the fundamental rights of individuals, has become 
a prime tool for regulating the Internet. Much of the EU’s influence in data 
protection occurs through the extraterritorial application of EU law. There are 
different varieties or degrees of extraterritoriality, which range from the direct 
application of EU law to parties or conduct in third countries, to ‘extraterritorial 
extension’, meaning governance by the EU of activities not centred on EU 
territory.93 With regard to EU data protection law, it is less important to categorize 
the exact form of extraterritoriality that the law uses, than to recognize that it 
exerts its influence in different ways on persons and activities in third countries.  
The direct extraterritorial application of EU data protection law through the 
use of rules of applicable law and jurisdiction is discussed below.94 A further 
example of extraterritoriality is provided by rules of EU data protection law that 
                                                      
88 See Bygrave, supra note 4, at 120 (Kindle edition). 
89 Article 29 Working Party, ‘Opinion 2/2003 on the application of the data protection principles to the 
WHOIS directories’ (WP 76, 13 June 2003), at 4. 
90 Bygrave, supra note 4, at 121 (Kindle edition). 
91 Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union, supra note 29. 
92 Ibid., at 14-16. 
93 See Scott, ‘Extraterritoriality and Territorial Extension of EU Law’, supra note 2, at 89; Scott, ‘The New 
Extraterritoriality’, supra note 2; Young, supra note 2, at 1241. 
94 See infra section 5E. 
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restrict the transfer of personal data to third countries. Article 25 of Directive 
95/46/EC allows data transfers to third countries only when an adequate level of 
data protection is provided in the country based on EU legal standards. The 
European Commission is empowered to issue a formal decision based on Article 
25 that a third country provides an adequate level of data protection,95 which is 
based on a determination that the foreign legal system in question offers a level of 
protection ‘essentially equivalent’ to that under EU law.96 When an adequacy 
decision has not been issued, Article 26(2) of Directive 95/46/EC permits 
transfers of personal data if ‘adequate safeguards’ are provided, which means in 
practice that standard contractual clauses issued by the European Commission 
have been signed between the data exporter in the EU and the data importer 
outside the EU obliging both to provide protections to the transfer and processing 
of the data,97 or that the party transferring the data has implemented binding 
corporate rules (BCRs, which are legally-binding internal data processing rules 
applied by a group of undertakings or enterprises engaged in a joint economic 
activity).98 In addition, derogations from the requirement of adequacy (e.g., when 
the data subject has consented to the transfer) may apply when there is no 
essential equivalence and appropriate safeguards cannot be used.99 
EU data protection law makes the processing of personal data transferred to 
third countries conditional on the external application of EU data protection 
standards.100 In the case of adequacy decisions this occurs through a formal 
evaluation of third country standards by the Commission, whereas in the case of 
adequate safeguards the parties that receive data exported from the EU are 
obliged, either by contract or through the adoption of BCRs, to apply protections 
based on EU law when they process data in third countries.101 This approach will 
                                                      
95 There are currently twelve European Commission adequacy decisions in force, covering Andorra; 
Argentina; the Canadian Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA); 
Switzerland; the Faroe Islands; Guernsey; Israel; the Isle of Man; Jersey; New Zealand; the EU-US 
Privacy Shield; and Uruguay. See <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/international-
transfers/adequacy/index_en.htm> (last visited 27 December 2016). In January 2017 the Commission 
announced that it will ‘actively engage with key trading partners in East and South-East Asia, starting 
from Japan and Korea in 2017, and, depending on progress towards the modernisation of its data 
protection laws, with India, but also with countries in Latin America, in particular Mercosur, and the 
European neighbourhood which have expressed an interest in obtaining an “adequacy finding”’. 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, ‘Exchanging and 
Protection Personal Data in a Globalised World’, COM(2017) 7 final, 10 January 2017, at 8. 
96 The Court of Justice articulated this standard in Schrems, supra note 69, at para. 73. 
97 See, e.g., Commission Decision (EC) 2010/87/EU of 5 February 2010 on standard contractual clauses 
for the transfer of personal data to processors established in third countries under Directive (EC) 
95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ 2010 L39/5, Clauses 5(a), 5(d)(i), and 5(e). 
98 GDPR, supra note 39, at Arts. 4(20) and 47. 
99 See Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 38, Art. 26(1). 
100 See Mills, ‘Private International Law and EU External Relations: Think Local Act Global, or Think 
Global Act Local?’, 65 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2016) 541, at 573-574. 
101 See, e.g., 2004/915/EC: Commission Decision of 27 December 2004 amending Decision 
2001/497/EC as regards the introduction of an alternative set of standard contractual clauses for the 
transfer of personal data to third countries, OJ 2004 L385/74, Clause II(h), requiring the data importer to 
process personal data exported from the EU with one of the following, at its option: 1) the data 
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continue to apply (in modified form) under the GDPR,102 which will introduce 
new data transfer mechanisms that are also based on the application of EU data 
protection standards in third countries. For example, under the GDPR codes of 
conduct and certification mechanisms that result in the application of EU data 
protection law to the processing of personal data outside the EU may serve as a 
legal basis for transfer.103 
The direct application of EU data protection law to third countries is also 
demonstrated by the fact that data protection authorities (DPAs) of the EU 
Member States have asserted their enforcement authority to investigate whether 
parties in third countries comply with EU law with regard to data transferred from 
the EU. The first such case occurred in 1996, when Citibank consented to have an 
on-site audit of its data processing facilities in the US conducted by the Berlin 
Data Protection Commissioner’s office.104 The Spanish Data Protection Agency 
has also conducted an audit of a third-party data processor located in Colombia 
regarding compliance with Spanish legal requirements for data transfers,105 and the 
Italian Data Protection Authority has obtained the consent of Google to audit the 
company’s compliance with EU data protection law on its premises in 
California.106 
EU data protection law also exercises global influence through the adoption 
by third countries of data protection laws based on the EU model. Dozens of 
countries worldwide have enacted data protection laws based on the model of 
Directive 95/46/EC,107 leading it to be called ‘by far the most influential 
international policy instrument’ in the field of data protection.108 Among the 
                                                                                                                                       
protection law of the country (i.e., the EU Member State) where the data exporter is established; 2) the 
relevant provisions of a Commission adequacy decision when the data importer is based in a country 
where such decision applies; or 3) a set of data protection principles contained in the contract and based 
on EU law. See also Article 29 Working Party, ‘Working Document Setting up a Framework for the 
structure of Binding Corporate Rules’ (WP 154, 24 June 2008), at 10, providing that ‘In any event data 
shall be processed in accordance to the applicable law as provided by the Article 4 of the Directive 
95/46/EC and the relevant local legislation.’ 
102 GDPR, supra note 39, at Chapter V. 
103 Ibid., Arts. 40(3) and 42(2). 
104 C. Bennett and C. Raab, The Governance of Privacy: Policy Instruments in Global Perspective (2006), at 98; P. 
Schwartz, ‘Managing Global Data Privacy: Cross-Border Information Flows in a Networked 
Environment’ (2009), <http://theprivacyprojects.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/08/The-Privacy-
Projects-Paul-Schwartz-Global-Data-Flows-20093.pdf> (last visited 11 November 2016), at 11-12. 
105 See Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, ‘Report on International Data Transfers: Ex officio 
Sectorial Inspection of Spain-Colombia at Call Centres’, July 2007, 
<https://www.agpd.es/portalweb/jornadas/transferencias_internacionales_datos/common/pdfs/report
_Inter_data_transfers_colombia_en.pdf> (last visited 11 November 2016). 
106 Essers, ‘Google agrees to Italian privacy authority audits in the US’, PC World, 20 February 2015, 
<http://www.pcworld.com/article/2887192/google-agrees-to-italian-privacy-authority-audits-in-the-
us.html> (last visited 11 November 2016). 
107 See, e.g., Bradford, supra note 2, at 22-26; L. Bygrave, Data Privacy Law: An International Perspective 
(2014), at 208 (Kindle edition), stating ‘the overwhelming bulk of countries that have enacted data privacy 
laws have followed, to a considerable degree, the EU model…’; Greenleaf, ‘The influence of European 
data privacy standards outside Europe: implications for globalization of Convention 108’, 2 International 
Data Privacy Law 68 (2012). 
108 Bennett and Raab, supra note 104, at 93. 
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developments that can be traced to the influence of the Directive are the adoption 
of data protection laws in Central and Eastern European countries that have 
acceded to the EU, the passage of federal privacy legislation in Canada in 2000, 
and the growth of privacy laws in Asian countries.109 The influence of EU data 
protection law can also be seen in the adoption of data protection acts in some 
African countries110 and the implementation of privacy standards and seal 
programs in the private sector.111  
The influence of EU data protection law has been due in part to the 
perceived economic benefit that can accrue to countries that enact it and are then 
able to import personal data under an EU adequacy decision112 (though whether 
an adequacy decision leads to economic benefits in practice does not seem to have 
been independently verified). The fact that EU data protection law is based on a 
set of clearly-structured instruments also makes it attractive to third countries, 
which often find it easier to use an existing text as a model rather than to draft 
new legislation from scratch. 
 
D. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 
 
The Internet is a relatively recent phenomenon, and there are few legally-binding 
international agreements or treaties dealing specifically with it.113 However, the 
example of one of them, the UNCITRAL Convention on Electronic 
Communications,114 shows how the relationship between the EU and its Member 
States influences the EU’s approach to the conclusion of international agreements 
dealing with the Internet. 
Both the European Commission and numerous Member States participated 
in the negotiation of the Convention.115 Early in the drafting, concerns were 
                                                      
109 Ibid., at 117. 
110 See, e.g., République du Sénégal, loi sur la protection des données à caractère personnel, exposé des 
motifs, <http://www.centif.sn/loi_caractere_personnel.pdf>, at 1 (last visited 11 November 2016); 
Traça and Embry, ‘An overview of the legal regime for data protection in Cape Verde’, 1 International Data 
Privacy Law (2011) 1. 
111 Bennett and Raab, supra note 104, at 172. 
112 See New Zealand Privacy Commissioner, ‘Privacy amendment important for trade and consumer 
protection’ (26 August 2010), <https://www.privacy.org.nz/news-and-publications/statements-media-
releases/updated-media-release-30-8-10-privacy-amendment-important-for-trade-and-consumer-
protection/> (last visited 10 November 2016), quoting the New Zealand Privacy Commissioner as 
follows regarding amendments to the New Zealand Privacy Act: ‘An EU adequacy finding is also likely to 
satisfy data export requirements of other countries. I believe New Zealand businesses are already losing 
some trading opportunities through a gap in our privacy laws. This change will allow New Zealand to 
compete on a secure basis for international data business’. See also Bennett and Raab, supra note 104, at 
113-114. 
113 Examples include the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime 2001, ETS No. 185; the WIPO 
Copyright Treaty 1996, 2186 UNTS 121 (2004); and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty 
1996, 2186 UNTS 203 (2004). See also Uerpmann-Wittzack, ‘Internetvölkerrecht’, 47 Archiv des 
Völkerrechts (2009) 261. 
114 See UNCITRAL Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications, supra note 36. 
115 See UNCITRAL, Working Group IV (Electronic Commerce), Forty-first session, New York, 5-9 May 
2003, Provisional List of Participants, UN DOC A/CN.9/WG.IV/XLI/INF.1. 
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expressed by the Commission about the effect that the Convention could have on 
the EU acquis communautaire,116 particularly the EU E-Commerce Directive 
2000/31/EC.117 In response to these concerns, the following ‘disconnection 
clause’ was incorporated into the Convention: 
 
1. A regional economic integration organization that is constituted by 
sovereign States and has competence over certain matters governed by this 
Convention may similarly sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to this 
Convention. The regional economic integration organization shall in that case 
have the rights and obligations of a Contracting State, to the extent that that 
organization has competence over matters governed by this Convention. 
Where the number of Contracting States is relevant in this Convention, the 
regional economic integration organization shall not count as a Contracting 
State in addition to its member States that are Contracting States. 
2. The regional economic integration organization shall, at the time of 
signature, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, make a declaration 
to the depositary specifying the matters governed by this Convention in 
respect of which competence has been transferred to that organization by its 
member States. The regional economic integration organization shall 
promptly notify the depositary of any changes to the distribution of 
competence, including new transfers of competence, specified in the 
declaration under this paragraph. 
3. Any reference to a ‘Contracting State’ or ‘Contracting States’ in this 
Convention applies equally to a regional economic integration organization 
where the context so requires. 
4. This Convention shall not prevail over any conflicting rules of any 
regional economic integration organization as applicable to parties whose 
respective places of business are located in States members of any such 
organization, as set out by declaration made in accordance with article 21.118 
 
The Convention was agreed on in 2005 and entered into force in 2013, but thus 
far neither the EU nor any of the Member States have signed it.119 The reason for 
this lies in the EU’s unhappiness with the final version of Clause 17(4), which 
requires either regional organizations (i.e., the EU) or their State members (i.e., the 
EU Member States) to make declarations under Article 21 in order to opt out of 
                                                      
116 See Killian, supra note 36, at 408. 
117 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal 
aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market, 2000 
OJ L178/1. 
118 UNCITRAL Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications, supra note 36, at Art. 17. 
119 See 
<http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/electronic_commerce/2005Convention_status.ht
ml> (last visited 14 November 2016). 
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application of the Convention to parties located in other State members.120 The 
Commission objected to this wording, and demanded that it be replaced by a 
formulation under which EU law would automatically take precedence over the 
Convention without the need for declarations to be made.121 Thus far neither the 
EU nor any Member States have signed or ratified the Convention. 
 
E. PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
Rules of EU law on applicable law and jurisdiction (referred to here as private 
international law) can have external effect even when they are adopted mainly to 
further internal goals, since they impact disputes or relationships that have 
connections with third countries.122 Private international law has thus become ‘the 
key to the private law of global affairs in a multi-jurisdictional world’.123  
Data protection law is a useful paradigm for examining the territorial scope 
of EU law as it relates to the Internet. Data protection in EU law is a self-
contained area with regard to applicable law and jurisdiction, since these are 
determined under Directive 95/46/EC rather than under instruments dealing 
specifically with private international law, at least insofar as administrative 
enforcement of the law by the DPAs is concerned.124 Under the GDPR, the 
territorial scope of application of data protection law will be expanded to include 
the processing of personal data of individuals in the EU by a data controller or 
data processor not established in the EU where the processing activities are related 
to the offering of goods or services to such individuals in the EU or the 
monitoring of their behaviour.125 The GDPR will thus extend the geographic 
reach of EU law to apply directly to the Internet activities of many parties in third 
countries. The new ePrivacy Regulation would also apply to providers of 
electronic communications services not established in the EU when they provide 
such services to end users in the EU.126 
The broad jurisdictional scope of EU data protection law on the Internet can 
be seen in two judgments of the Court of Justice. In Google Spain,127 the Court 
found that EU data protection law granted individuals a right to suppress search 
                                                      
120 See Killian, supra note 36, at 411-414. 
121 Ibid. 
122 See Mills, supra note 100, at 542. 
123 Basedow, supra note 1, at 35. 
124 See Case C-230/14, Weltimmo, 1 October 2015 (ECLI:EU:C:2015:639), at paras. 23, 51-52, finding that 
for the purposes of data protection law, Art. 4 of the Directive determines choice of law and Art. 28(6) 
determines jurisdiction. See also Brjkan, ‘Data protection and European private international law: 
observing a bull in a China shop’, 5 International Data Privacy Law (2015) 257. 
125 GDPR, supra note 39, Art. 3(2). 
126 ePrivacy Regulation, supra note 40, at Art. 3(1). 
127 See Google Spain, supra note 78, at paras. 42-61. See also Kuner, ‘The Court of Justice of the EU 
Judgment on Data Protection and Internet Search Engines: Current Issues and Future Challenges’, in B. 
Hess and C. M. Mariottini (eds), Protecting Privacy in Private International and Procedural Law and by Data 
Protection (2015) 19, at 27-31. 
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engine results in certain situations, even though the servers on which the search 
engine operated were based in California. The French data protection authority 
(the CNIL) has interpreted the judgment to apply to searches performed on web 
sites in all domains globally (this issue is currently the subject of litigation in the 
French courts).128 And in Schrems, the Court of Justice applied EU data protection 
law to the transfer of personal data to the US for processing there.129  
 
F. OTHER AREAS 
 
EU law has extended its global reach with regard to the Internet in other fields as 
well, only two of which will be considered here. 
In L’Oréal v. eBay, the Court of Justice applied EU trade mark law to the sale 
on an Internet auction site of a trade-marked product in a third country when such 
sale was targeted at customers in the EU.130 The Court thus extended the reach of 
EU law to third countries when failing to do so would have an impact on the 
effectiveness of EU rules.131 And in May 2016 a number of leading Internet 
companies (including Google, Facebook, Twitter, and Microsoft) agreed to apply 
EU rules on hate speech following pressure from the EU Member States and the 
European Commission.132 
 
 
 
6. MECHANISMS OF GLOBAL REACH 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 
EU law exerts its global reach by means of different mechanisms. Sometimes they 
are exercised intentionally, whereas in other situations they may apply as an 
afterthought or as part of some other phenomenon. These mechanisms are often 
intermingled, so that it can be difficult to determine which one applies in a 
                                                      
128 See ‘Right to be delisted: the CNIL Restricted Committee imposes a €100,000 fine on Google’, 24 
March 2016, <https://www.cnil.fr/en/right-be-delisted-cnil-restricted-committee-imposes-eu100000-
fine-google> (last visited 10 November 2016). 
129 See Schrems, supra note 69, at paras. 45-46. 
130 L’Oréal SA and Others v. eBay International AG and Others, Case C-324/09, [2011] ECR I-6011 
(ECLI:EU:C:2011:474). 
131 See Jääskinen and Ward, ‘The External Reach of EU Private Law in the Light of L’Oréal versus eBay and 
Google and Google Spain’, in Cremona and Micklitz, supra note 81, location 4843, at location 5123 (Kindle 
edition).  
132 See D. Robinson, ‘Web giants sign up to EU hate speech rules’, Financial Times, 31 May 2016, 
<https://www.ft.com/content/e8fb1690-26fc-11e6-8ba3-cdd781d02d89#axzz4ACePo5cX> (last visited 
10 November 2016), noting that ‘The move comes after EU ministers demanded that the bloc work with 
IT companies to “counter terrorist propaganda” during an emergency meeting in the aftermath of the 
Brussels terror attacks’ and ‘This push to codify the handling of illegal hate speech online has been led in 
Brussels by Vera Jourová, the commissioner responsible for justice’. 
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particular case, or they may apply in combination. But enough evidence exists to 
allow classification of the different mechanisms.  
 
B. EMULATION AND LEARNING 
 
One approach can be referred to as learning from EU law, or emulating it in 
domestic or international law-making. This can occur for various reasons, such as 
affinities in legal culture that make the EU example attractive to a third country, or 
the fact that EU law tends to be contained in legal instruments (such as directives, 
regulations, etc.) that on their face may seem easy to emulate.133  
This emulation is encouraged by EU external action policy, which seeks to 
promote adoption of EU law in third countries in areas relevant to the Internet 
(such as data protection law), including financing technical assistance projects that 
allow experts from the EU to work with third countries.134 For example, in 2011 
such assistance was given by the EU to Mauritius, focused on ‘ensuring the data 
protection accreditation of Mauritius with the European Union’.135 
It can be difficult to distinguish learning or emulation from coercion. For 
example, what may seem to be the adoption of EU standards based on a voluntary 
decision by a third country may in fact be motivated by behind-the-scenes political 
pressure. In some cases, both third countries and the EU may not want to reveal 
the extent of the influence that EU law has had. 
In certain areas EU law has become the leading model that other countries 
seek to emulate; a good example of this is data protection law. There are dozens of 
data protection laws in all regions around the world that have been inspired by the 
EU model,136 and international organisations such as the Office of the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)137 and the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC)138 have also turned to EU law as an important source of 
inspiration when adopting data protection policies and guidelines. As such policies 
become more widely adopted among different international organisations and are 
considered to lead to binding obligations, they may gradually crystallize into 
                                                      
133 But see infra section 7C regarding the difficulty of replicating EU law outside the borders of the EU. 
134 See Communication from the Commission, supra note 95, at 12. See also Pech, supra note 73, at 19.  
135 See 
<http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/mauritius/eu_mauritius/development_cooperation/technical_coop
eration/index_en.htm> (last visited 13 November 2016). 
136 See supra note 107. 
137 UNHCR, ‘Policy on the Protection of Personal Data of Persons of Concern to UNHCR’, EJIL: Talk!, 
May 2015, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/55643c1d4.html> (last visited 14 November 2016). See 
Beck and Kuner, ‘Data Protection in International Organizations and the new UNHCR Data Protection 
Policy: Light at the End of the Tunnel?’, <http://www.ejiltalk.org/data-protection-in-international-
organizations-and-the-new-unhcr-data-protection-policy-light-at-the-end-of-the-tunnel/#more-13568> 
(last visited 14 November 2016). 
138 ICRC, ‘ICRC Rules on Personal Data Protection’, January 2016, 
<https://shop.icrc.org/publications/international-humanitarian-law/icrc-rules-on-personal-data-
protection.html> (last visited 14 November 2016). See also Brussels Privacy Hub and International 
Committee of the Red Cross, Handbook on Data Protection in International Humanitarian Action (2017). 
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customary international law.139 In such cases EU law may provide the basis for the 
progressive development of rules of public international law. 
Courts in third countries have been influenced by judgments of the Court of 
Justice in cases involving the Internet. This influence has resulted in the export of 
European law, which has been described thusly: 
 
European judges ‘export’ European ideas outside Europe. Put differently, 
European courts’ rulings, which are extensively quoted in an attempt to 
increase the legitimacy and persuasiveness of their own rulings, inspire and 
influence non-European Union judges.140 
 
An example is the Court’s Google Spain judgment, where it recognised the so-called 
‘right to be forgotten’ (actually a right to suppression of results generated by 
Internet search engines).141 This judgment has served as inspiration for courts in 
third countries, such as Canada.142 The EU has generally viewed this influence as a 
one-way street in which EU standards are exported to third countries rather than 
vice versa, leading to what has been called a ‘Europeanization’ of the regulation of 
the Internet.143 
EU legal standards have also influenced private sector practices in third 
countries, as can be seen in the example of data protection law.144 Among the 
reasons for such influence are the need to conform to EU standards in order to 
compete in Europe; the power of the European market; the importance of privacy 
in the public consciousness; and the need to ensure that EU law is not 
undermined by lower standards elsewhere.145 
 
C. INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION 
 
The EU participates actively in a number of international fora dealing with 
Internet law and regulation. This includes UN-based organisations dealing with 
Internet governance, such as the IGF; other multilateral organisations, such as the 
Council of Europe and the OECD; international legal harmonization 
organisations such as UNCITRAL; and many others. In the scope of such 
                                                      
139 See with regard to the development of rules of customary international law as a process of 
‘crystallization’, H. Thirlway, The Sources of International Law (2014), at 66 (Kindle edition). 
140 Kowalik-Bańczyk and Pollicino, ‘Migration of European Judicial Ideas concerning Jurisdiction over 
Google on Withdrawal of Information’, 17 German Law Journal (2016) 315, at 333. 
141 Google Spain, supra note 78, at paras. 62-99. 
142 See Kowalik-Bańczyk and Pollicino, supra note 140. 
143 Ibid., supra note 140, at 335. 
144 See K. Bamberger and D. Mulligan, Privacy on the Ground (2015), at 65, noting with regard to a survey of 
company privacy officers in the US that ‘respondents explained that European law plays a large role in 
shaping such company-wide privacy policies’, and that ‘the influence of US law was evidenced by specific 
activities such as Safe Harbor certification’. 
145 Bradford, supra note 2, at 24-26; Shaffer, ‘Globalization and Social Protection: the Impact of EU and 
International Rules in the Ratcheting Up of US Privacy Standards’, 25 Yale Journal of International Law 
(2000) 1, at 81-88. 
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participation, the EU exercises its influence, which includes promoting its values 
and interests. This involves a process of competition against the values and 
interests of other regions, which can be seen in Internet-related areas such as data 
protection, where there is often competition between the EU and the US to push 
their respective views.146 
EU activity at the international level is also motivated by political factors. For 
example, during the negotiation of the GDPR, I observed the EU using its 
influence in the Council of Europe to prevent amendments to Convention 108 
from being approved, based on the perception that this would ‘steal the thunder’ 
of the EU if reformed data protection rules were adopted at the international level 
before the EU adopted its GDPR. This shows how EU action in international 
negotiation can be motivated, at least in part, by the desire to successfully realize 
its internal legislative projects, and to overshadow similar multilateral projects. 
 
D. COERCION AND CONDITIONALITY 
 
Another approach can be characterized as coercion, meaning pressuring third 
countries to adopt certain policies through the mechanism of conditionality, i.e., 
making access to resources or benefits conditional on compliance with the EU’s 
policy requirements.147 Coercion need not always be viewed negatively, as a polity 
may legitimately make the granting of legal and political benefits contingent on the 
meeting of certain conditions. Indeed, the EU makes accession conditional on 
accepting and implementing the acquis communautaire, which constitutes a form 
of coercion.148 More direct exercises of coercion can be seen in actions such as the 
agreement of Internet companies in 2016 to adopt rules against hate speech 
following pressure from the Member States and the European Commission.149 
Another example of this ‘carrot and stick’ approach is the use of adequacy 
decisions issued by the European Commission confirming that a third country 
offers an adequate level of data protection based on EU standards. The EU uses 
this approach in other areas as well, such as private international law, trade law, 
and environmental standards.150 The ‘carrot’ in this approach is the offer of 
extending preferential status to third countries once their data protection 
standards are certified as being ‘essentially equivalent’ to those of EU law, which is 
considered to grant economic benefits by allow personal data to be transferred 
freely to such countries. The ‘stick’ is the fact that EU law permits the free flow of 
data to third countries only when they adopt EU standards, and that it is also 
                                                      
146 See, e.g., Greenleaf, supra note 107, at 73, describing attempts by the US government and US 
companies ‘to use their combined economic and political influence to limit the development of data 
privacy laws in other countries’. 
147 Gilardi, supra note 2, at 13 (all citations to online version). 
148 Regarding EU accession as a form of coercion see ibid., at 14. 
149 See supra note 132. 
150 See Mills, supra note 100, at 542-543. 
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possible for the European Commission to reach a finding that they do not offer 
adequate protection151 or that an existing adequacy decision should be repealed, 
amended, or suspended (though this has never been done).152 
Providers of Internet data storage services have located their data centres in 
the EU in order to escape restrictions on international data transfers under EU 
law. As one news story puts it, global technology giants ‘are racing to store their 
data on the Continent as new laws and privacy concerns drive investment 
decisions’.153 Data storage companies also market their services based on having 
infrastructure located in the EU,154 and global companies have started aligning 
their privacy policies with the GDPR.155 These examples demonstrate the power 
of EU law to change the behaviour of commercial actors with regard to their 
Internet activities. 
Passing judgment on whether the law of third countries is adequate based on 
EU standards risks entangling legal analysis with political factors. For example, in 
July 2010 the government of Ireland delayed an EU adequacy decision for Israel 
based on alleged Israeli government involvement in the forging of Irish 
passports.156 The process of negotiating data protection adequacy assessments has 
also led to political tensions with third countries.157 
 
E. BLOCKING RECOGNITION OF THIRD COUNTRY LEGAL MEASURES 
 
EU law may block recognition of third country legal measures that conflict with its 
own values. This is a method of extending the global reach of EU law, since it is 
based on an assertion of EU values in relation to legal measures taken by a third 
country. 
                                                      
151 Under the Directive 95/46/EC, the Commission may find that a third country does not provide an 
adequate level of data protection. See Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 38, Art. 25(3).  
152 See GDPR, supra note 39, Art. 45(5). 
153 Cerullus, ‘It’s raining cloud storage in Europe’, POLITICO, 24 November 2016, at 20, 
<http://www.politico.eu/pro/its-commission-vs-the-market-on-data-flows/>, (last accessed 26 
December 2016). 
154 See Martin-Jung, ‘Wir sind NSA-Frei’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 16 November 2016, at 26, in 
which the European head of Fujitsu states regarding the company’s cloud storage services that ‘We are 
located in Germany and have a German infrastructure, we are free of the NSA…’ (author’s translation).  
155 See Communication from the Commission, supra note 95, at 2. 
156 See Ihle, ‘Ireland blocks EU data sharing with Israel’, JTA, 8 July 2010, 
<http://www.jta.org/2010/07/08/news-opinion/world/ireland-blocks-eu-data-sharing-with-israel> (last 
visited 16 December 2016). Israel later received an adequacy decision from the European Commission. 
Commission Decision 2011/61/EU of 31 January 2011 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the adequate protection of personal data by the State of 
Israel with regard to automated processing of personal data, [2011] OJ L27/39. 
157 See Stoddart, Chan, and Joly, ‘The European Union’s Adequacy Approach to Privacy and 
International Data Sharing in Health Research’, 44 The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics (2016) 143 
(concerning tensions with Quebec); Mucci, Cerulus, and Von Der Burchard, ‘Data fight emerges as last 
big hurdle to EU-Japan trade deal’, POLITICO, 9 December 2016, <http://www.politico.eu/article/eu-
japan-trade-deal-caught-up-in-data-flow-row-cecilia-malmstrom/> (last visited 16 December 2016). 
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An example of this is Article 48 of the GDPR, which limits the enforceability 
of decisions of third country courts and administrative authorities in the EU, and 
reads as follows:  
 
Any judgment of a court or tribunal and any decision of an administrative 
authority of a third country requiring a controller or processor to transfer or 
disclose personal data may only be recognised or enforceable in any manner 
if based on an international agreement, such as a mutual legal assistance 
treaty, in force between the requesting third country and the Union or a 
Member State, without prejudice to other grounds for transfer pursuant to 
this Chapter.158  
 
This provision is similar to so-called ‘blocking statutes’159 that protect parties in 
the EU from what are viewed as exorbitant jurisdictional assertions by third 
countries. For example, French law prohibits the disclosure to foreign public 
authorities (such as courts or administrative authorities) of data or information if 
this would impair the important interests of France.160 Member State data 
protection authorities have also refused to authorize the use of cross-border data 
processing networks in the EU when their implementation is based on third 
country legislation that violates EU data protection standards. In two cases the 
CNIL refused to authorize the use in France of electronic hotlines for the 
confidential, anonymous submission of employee complaints (commonly called 
whistleblowing hotlines) regarding questionable auditing or accounting matters in 
their operations outside the US, although many US companies regard use of such 
hotlines as being compelled by the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act.161 
 
 
 
7. NORMATIVE QUESTIONS 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 
EU law does not use a single normative approach to exercise its global reach 
regarding the Internet. The lack of a comprehensive, overarching approach is not 
surprising in light of the Internet’s relative novelty; the wide variety of EU 
                                                      
158 GDPR, supra note 39, Art. 48. 
159 See regarding blocking statutes in general, Basedow, supra note 1, at 334-342; D. Cooper and C. 
Kuner, ‘Data Protection Law and International Dispute Resolution’, 382 Recueil des cours/Collected Courses of 
the Hague Academy of International Law (2017) (forthcoming). 
160 Loi n° 80-538 du 16 juillet 1980 relative à la communication de documents ou renseignements d’ordre 
économique, commercial ou technique à des personnes physiques ou morales étrangères. 
161 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301(4)(A), (B). See regarding these two cases, 
Dowling, ‘Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblower Hotlines Across Europe: Directions Through the Maze’, 42 
International Lawyer (2008) 1. 
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institutions and legal instruments that deal with it; and the fragmented landscape 
of norms and actors involved in its governance and regulation. This accords with 
the general view that the manifestations of the global impact of EU law vary based 
on factors such as how difficult they are to realize and how significant they are.162 
However, there is no doubt that in recent years the EU has made use of the 
increased legal powers available to it under the Treaty of Lisbon and the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights to extend its reach to Internet activities beyond its borders, 
as demonstrated by the growing number of legislative and regulatory initiatives 
adopted in recent years (e.g., the GDPR), and the increased willingness of the 
Court of Justice to assert EU values in its case law dealing with Internet-related 
topics (e.g., Google Spain and Schrems). In this regard, the Internet has served as a 
vehicle allowing EU law to assert itself in the wider world. The increasing global 
reach of EU law as it concerns the Internet raises some important normative 
questions that are dealt with below. 
 
B. EU VALUES OR EU INTERESTS? 
 
As described earlier,163 in its external action the EU must uphold and promote its 
‘values’, which the TEU lists as ‘human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the 
rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging 
to minorities’.164 These are described later on in the TEU as the principles which 
the EU ‘seeks to advance in the wider world’,165 and together seem to represent 
the core values of EU law. 
However, in its external action the EU must also be guided by other concepts 
that are more political in nature. Thus, in its relations with the wider world the EU 
is required to uphold and promote its ‘interests’,166 to define and pursue its 
‘common policies and actions’,167 and to safeguard its ‘fundamental interests’.168 
As stated above, the Council is obliged to identify the EU’s ‘strategic interests’ in 
the context of external action.169 The TEU does not define these terms or state 
what the difference is (if any) between them.  
The influence of legal values when the EU exerts its global reach can be seen 
in the judgments of the Court of Justice in Internet-related cases, and in EU 
legislation such as the GDPR. The influence of political factors can be seen in the 
following statement by the European Commission concerning the adoption of 
adequacy decisions covering the level of data protection in third countries: 
                                                      
162 See Young, supra note 2, at 1237. 
163 See supra section 4A. 
164 TEU, supra note 8, at Art. 2. 
165 Ibid., at Art. 21(1). 
166 Ibid., at Art. 3(5). 
167 Ibid., at Art. 21(2). 
168 Ibid., at Art. 21(2)(a). 
169 See supra note 31. 
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Under its framework on adequacy findings, the Commission considers 
that the following criteria should be taken into account when assessing with 
which third countries a dialogue on adequacy should be pursued: 
(i) the extent of the EU's (actual or potential) commercial relations with 
a given third country, including the existence of a free trade agreement or 
ongoing negotiations;  
(ii) the extent of personal data flows from the EU, reflecting 
geographical and/or cultural ties;  
(iii) the pioneering role the third country plays in the field of privacy and 
data protection that could serve as a model for other countries in its region; 
and  
(iv) the overall political relationship with the third country in question, 
in particular with respect to the promotion of common values and shared 
objectives at international level.170 
 
It is not clear how basing a decision to initiate adequacy discussions with third 
countries on factors that are obviously political in nature is consistent with the 
insistence by the Court of Justice in Schrems that the Commission’s discretion with 
regard to the adequacy of protection ensured by a third country ‘is reduced’, and 
that its review of the requirements stemming from EU data protection law and the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights should be ‘strict’.171 It seems that the EU 
would like to have its cake and eat it too by having one institution (the Court of 
Justice) insist on strict legal standards for adequacy decisions, while another one 
(the Commission) prioritizes discussions with third countries based on political 
factors. The entanglement of EU legal values with the EU’s political interests can 
also be seen in the way the Court of Justice has defined the territorial scope of EU 
law on the Internet largely in terms of the policy objectives that the law seeks to 
pursue.172 
The increasing importance of the Internet means that it is bound to become 
the subject of political disputes. However, as legal values become enmeshed with 
political considerations, or as the latter are presented as the former, the core values 
of EU law are diluted, and it becomes more difficult to develop a coherent 
normative basis for EU law as it relates to the Internet, particular when EU values 
are advanced as universal values.173 The various political concepts that the EU is 
supposed to promote in its external action require further clarification, and their 
role should be more clearly distinguished from that of fundamental EU legal 
values. As the EU increasingly asserts its global reach regarding Internet-related 
issues, it will be important for it to differentiate between legal and political values, 
and to be more honest about when each applies and for what reason.  
                                                      
170 Communication from the Commission, supra note 95, at 8. 
171 Schrems, supra note 69, at para. 78. 
172 See infra section 7E. 
173 See infra section 7C. 
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C. EU LAW AS UNIVERSAL VALUES 
 
The EU increasingly asserts its values as universal, global standards for the 
Internet. This can be seen in the words of some of the leading figures involved in 
the adoption of the GDPR: 
 
▪ Former EU Commissioner Viviane Reding: ‘Europe must act decisively 
to establish a robust data protection framework that can be the gold 
standard for the world’.174 
▪ MEP Jan-Philipp Albrecht, Rapporteur in the European Parliament for 
the GDPR: The GDPR will change ‘nothing less than the whole world as 
we know it’.175 
▪ An unnamed EU official: ‘With these proposals, the EU is becoming the 
de facto world regulator on data protection’.176 
 
In a lengthy newspaper interview following the Schrems judgment, President of the 
Court of Justice Koen Lenaerts left no doubt about the leading role which he 
believes EU law should play in the wider world: 
 
Europe must not be ashamed of its basic principles: The rule of law is not up 
for sale. It is a matter of upholding the requirements in the European Union, 
of the rule of law, of fundamental rights. If this is also affecting some 
dealings internationally, why would Europe not be proud to contribute its 
requiring standards of respect of fundamental rights to the world in 
general?177 
 
EU law has arisen in a unique constitutional and institutional context,178 which 
gives rise to a paradox: if EU law is unique and fundamentally different from other 
legal systems, then how can it be replicated elsewhere, and how can third countries 
be expected to adopt it? Many third countries have adopted legislation close to the 
EU model in areas such as data protection, but few have been found to have laws 
that are adequate and thus essentially equivalent to EU standards. Whether a norm 
                                                      
174 See Reding, ‘A data protection compact for Europe’, 28 January 2014, available online at 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-62_en.htm> (last visited 13 November 2016). See 
also Kuner, ‘The European Union and the Search for an International Data Protection Framework’, 2 
Groningen Journal of International Law (2014) 55, at 57. 
175 Albrecht, ‘How the GDPR will change the world’, 3 European Data Protection Law Review (2016) 287, at 
287. 
176 See T. Vogel, ‘Reding seeks overhaul of data protection rules’, European Voice, 15 December 2011, 
available online at <http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/reding-seeks-overhaul-of-data-protection-
rules/> (last visited 13 November 2016). 
177 Popp, ‘ECJ President on EU Integration, Public Opinion, Safe Harbor, Antitrust’, The Wall Street 
Journal, 14 October 2015, <http://blogs.wsj.com/brussels/2015/10/14/ecj-president-on-eu-integration-
public-opinion-safe-harbor-antitrust/tab/print/> (last visited 10 November 2016). 
178 See, e.g., Rosas and Armati, supra note 35, at 4 (referring to ‘the unique nature of the EU as a legal and 
constitutional order’) and 12 (referring to the EU as ‘a unique organisation’) (Kindle edition). 
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is based on a fundamental legal value or on a political interest also affects the 
ability to assert it as being global or universal, since it would be unreasonable to 
expect third countries to accept the EU’s political interests as universal values.  
When a legal system strives for its standards to be accepted as universal 
values, it is inevitably engaged in a hegemonic struggle in which it seeks to have its 
own interests identified with the general interest.179 The EU is engaged in such a 
struggle, as can be seen in the area of data protection, where the Commission 
cloaks efforts to promote the spread of EU law in the language of encouraging 
third countries and international organisations to adopt strong data protection 
standards.180 
The promotion of EU law as a set of universal values can also backfire when 
third countries take the same approach towards the EU regarding their own law. 
As globalization proceeds, more countries are likely to insist on compliance with 
their legal requirements concerning conduct on the Internet. This can involve, for 
example, a third country allowing data transfers to the EU only when it (i.e., the 
EU) provides adequate protection based on third country law. Indeed, such 
requirements already exist in the provisions of some third country data protection 
laws that allow international data transfers only when the country to which data 
are transferred provides adequate protection.181 Insisting on reciprocity on the part 
of the EU is logical from the point of view of third countries, and is a 
consequence of the EU’s assertion of its own standards towards third countries. 
The EU should thus keep in mind the possibility of its own global reach 
mechanisms being imitated and used against it. 
 
D. DIVERGENCE BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE 
 
There is an important distinction between the spread of EU legal values and their 
protection in practice. For example, the fact that EU data protection law has 
influenced the adoption of data protection legislation around the world does not 
necessarily mean that this has led to a higher level of data protection on the 
                                                      
179 See Koskenniemi and Leino, ‘Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties’, 15 Leiden 
Journal of International Law (2002) 553, at 561-562. 
180 See Communication from the Commission, supra note 95, at 10, where the Commission states that it 
will ‘work with and assist countries interested in adopting strong data protection laws and support their 
convergence with EU data protection principles’; ibid., at 12, where the Commission supports the ‘swift 
adoption’ of the modernized text of Council of Europe Convention 108 since the Convention ‘will reflect 
the same principles as those enshrined in the new EU data protection rules and thus contribute to the 
convergence towards a set of high data protection standards;’ and ibid., at 16, stating that the EU will 
actively engage with third countries to explore adequacy findings ‘with a view to fostering regulatory 
convergence towards the EU standards…’. 
181 See, e.g., Angola, Law no. 22/11 on the Protection of Personal Data, Art. 33; Economic Community 
of West African States (ECOWAS), Supplementary Act A/SA.1/01/10 on Personal Data Protection 
within ECOWAS (16 February 2010), Art. 36; Japanese Act on the Protection of Personal Information 
(as amended 2015), Art. 24; Macau Special Administrative Region (MSAR) of the People’s Republic of 
China, Personal Data Protection Act (Act 8/2005), Art. 19. See also C. Kuner, Transborder Data Flows and 
Data Privacy Law (2013), at 65-66. 
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Internet. Determining the extent to which EU values are actually reflected in 
practice on the Internet would require a large-scale empirical study that has yet to 
be conducted. 
EU law focuses on application of its norms to the Internet in a legal sense 
(e.g., the application of EU law to Internet-related activities, or the adoption by 
third countries of law based on EU models), rather than on an evaluation of 
whether the legal values that the EU seeks to export are upheld in practice. An 
example of this phenomenon can be seen in the proposed ePrivacy Regulation,182 
Article 3(2) of which requires parties not established in the EU that provide 
electronic communications services (i.e., many types of web sites, services that use 
connected devices, etc.) to users in the EU to designate a ‘representative in the 
Union’ in writing. The proposed Regulation describes the duties of 
representatives, but contains no details about how they should be appointed, what 
liability they have, and other important practical points. This proposal mirrors the 
system of representatives mandated in Directive 95/46/EU for data controllers 
not established in the EU,183 which has also never been practically implemented.184 
There are well over 1 billion web sites on the Internet,185 not even counting the 
many other types of services covered by the proposed Regulation, and the 
resources necessary for establishing and policing a system for the appointment and 
registration of representatives on such a huge scale would seem to be far beyond 
the capabilities of any EU or Member State institution. These provisions thus 
seem to be a textbook example of regulatory overreaching, i.e., of law being 
applied so broadly that it stands little chance of being enforced.186 
In order for the application of EU law to be meaningful, it must be effective 
in practice as well as apply on paper, as the Court of Justice has recognized. For 
example, the CJEU in Schrems emphasized that protections provided for personal 
data transferred from the EU to third countries must ‘prove, in practice, effective 
in order to ensure protection essentially equivalent to that guaranteed within the 
European Union’.187 EU law should put greater emphasis on determining not only 
whether its standards apply to Internet activity in a legal sense, but on whether the 
values that underlie them are fulfilled in practice. The first steps toward such an 
approach can be found in the annual review foreseen in the EU-US Privacy Shield, 
though the depth and scope of the review remain to be seen.188 
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E. THE TERRITORIAL SCOPE OF EU LAW 
 
The Internet raises questions about how the EU should act with regard to conduct 
that occurs outside its borders but has an effect within them.189 It is easier to state 
that EU law should be given wide territorial application when important public 
policy interests are at stake190 than to determine what the limits of such application 
are.  
EU law adopts a schizophrenic attitude to the territorial application of law on 
the Internet. On the one hand, the EU and its Member States insist on limits to 
jurisdiction based on sovereignty when jurisdictional assertions against the EU by 
third countries are involved; this can be seen, for example, in the insistence by the 
EU and the Member States on using the Hague Convention on the Taking of 
Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters (the Hague Evidence 
Convention)191 as the exclusive means for discovery of evidence abroad,192 and the 
enactment in some Member States of so-called blocking statutes193 that restrict 
compliance with the extraterritorial scope of foreign discovery requirements. On 
the other hand, judgments such as Google Spain and Schrems demonstrate that EU 
law applies broadly to actions by third countries when this is necessary to defend 
EU substantive legal standards.194  
The Court’s current approach to defining the territorial scope of EU law on 
the Internet is largely based on the policy objectives that the law seeks to pursue. 
For example, the result of the Court’s Google Spain judgment has been described as 
follows: ‘the (territorial) scope of application of EU secondary law is determined 
by its policy objectives: a direct correlation can be established between the 
achievement of EU policies and the potential need to cover situations located in 
third states’.195 The greater the paucity of guidance by the legislator as to the 
territorial scope of law, the higher the risk that courts will be left to determine it 
based on their interpretation of the EU’s policy objectives of the moment.196 Such 
a consequentialist approach risks sacrificing the coherence and consistency that are 
inherent in a legal (rather than a political) method of interpretation, and may result 
in the entanglement of legal values and political interests that has already been 
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discussed below.197  
EU law is still searching for a paradigm for its application to the Internet that 
is based on firm legal principles, secures the rights of EU individuals, and avoids 
jurisdictional overreach. That some limits to jurisdiction must exist is indicated by 
the Court of Justice’s Air Transport Association of America198 judgment, where it 
found that EU law should not apply to aircraft registered in third countries that fly 
over third countries or the high seas, but that it can exercise jurisdiction when an 
aircraft arrives or departs from a Member State.199 This judgment indicates the 
outlines of a jurisdictional approach to the Internet as well, i.e., to avoid applying 
EU law to parties and situations outside its borders that have no contact or 
connection with the EU, but to extend its application to situations that have effect 
in the EU or on EU individuals. Of course, the application of such an approach 
would depend on resolving difficult questions such as what constitutes a sufficient 
contact or connection to justify the assertion of EU law, and what it means for 
conduct to have ‘effects’ regarding the EU. It will be up to the Court of Justice to 
define these parameters in greater detail as cases involving the Internet are brought 
before it or referred to it, which will no doubt happen with increasing frequency.  
 
F. RESPONSIBILITIES TOWARDS THIRD COUNTRIES 
 
In examining the global reach of EU law, the focus has almost invariably been on 
the degree of influence of EU law, i.e., on the power exercised by the EU. But 
along with influence and power goes responsibility, and this raises the question of 
whether the EU has responsibilities to third countries that adopt its standards.  
The existence of such responsibilities, particularly towards developing countries, 
finds support in the TEU, which requires the EU to foster ‘the sustainable 
economic, social and environmental development of developing countries, with 
the primary aim of eradicating poverty’.200 The Internet can be seen as a vehicle 
for fostering the economic and social development of third countries, and thus 
may be viewed as falling within this provision. Raising EU legal norms to the 
status of universal norms201 also strengthens the case for the EU to assume greater 
responsibility for their effects when they are asserted globally. 
EU law has been willing to exert its influence on third countries, but less 
inclined to learn from them. For example, the following has been stated regarding 
the judicial dialogue between the EU courts and courts in third countries: 
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The European courts seem more inclined ‘to teach’ rather than ‘to learn’ 
when discussing the protection, erga omnes (towards everyone), of European 
constitutional values, even beyond the reaches of Europe. In other words, the 
European judicial dialogue remains European-value-based even when 
globalized.202 
 
There is a growing realisation that ‘as agents of humanity, sovereigns are obligated 
to take other-regarding considerations seriously into account in formulating and 
implementing policies…’.203 It seems reasonable to conclude that this principle 
should also apply when one legal system exercises influence over others, 
particularly when it aims to have its values adopted as global standards. The global 
reach of EU law should not be purely a matter of power politics, i.e., of the EU 
seeing how far it can extend its influence towards third countries, but should 
subject it to responsibilities as well. These responsibilities are especially compelling 
with regard to developing countries, towards which there is a well-documented 
history of hegemony on the part of European legal systems.204 
The EU’s responsibilities towards third countries can be seen in the example 
of EU data protection law. Many of the third countries that have enacted 
legislation based on EU data protection law are developing countries with limited 
resources, and enacting a legal framework for data protection based on EU 
standards with all that entails can be a significant burden on their resources.205 The 
GDPR is considerably longer and more complex than the Directive 95/46/EC 
that it will replace, and adopting data protection legislation that is essentially 
equivalent to the GDPR, or revising existing legislation to meet this standard, will 
require third countries to invest in a large-scale legislative project that could take 
many years. 
If EU law is to be the ‘de facto standard for the world’, then the EU has 
certain responsibilities towards other countries that adopt it. Setting up EU law as 
an influential standard on a global basis should involve more than simply 
motivating other countries to adopt it and then leaving them to their own devices. 
Recognition of such responsibilities would ultimately be in the EU’s own interest, 
since it would provide additional incentives for other countries to adopt EU law. 
The EU should thus implement measures to consider the effect on third countries 
of its rules, and to provide a mechanism for them to obtain information about EU 
law quickly and easily. This could include measures such as establishing an 
Internet portal with information on EU legal developments with particular 
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relevance to third countries, and soliciting input from third countries to learn 
about the impact of EU law on them. The increased interaction with third 
countries produced by such measures could also benefit the EU by illuminating 
areas where it could learn from third country law, a possibility that the 
Commission seems to accept as far as data protection is concerned.206 
Finding that the EU has certain responsibilities towards third countries that are 
influenced by its law raises another question, namely whether in applying its law to 
third countries the EU is setting standards for them that it is not prepared to live 
up to itself. Strictly speaking, the standards of EU law and those of third country 
law are two different matters, but in a moral sense, the legitimacy of EU law is 
undermined if the EU is viewed as holding third countries to higher standards 
than it is obligated to meet.  
An example can be seen in the Schrems judgment, where the Court of Justice 
held the conclusion of adequacy decisions by the European Commission regarding 
the level of data protection in third countries to a high standard, particularly 
regarding access to data by third country intelligence authorities. However, Article 
4 TEU grants competence for national security to the Member States, and there is 
widespread sharing of information by intelligence agencies of the Member States 
with third countries such as the US, both under the ‘Five Eyes’207 intelligence-
sharing network (which includes Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK, and the 
US), and under bilateral arrangements involving Member States such as France208 
and Germany.209 Thus, there are substantial gaps in legal protection against 
intelligence surveillance under EU law, which undermines the moral legitimacy of 
criticisms of third country standards. It would increase the influence of EU law on 
the international stage if the EU were to ensure that it can itself satisfy the 
standards that it expects third countries to meet. 
 
G. IS THE INTERNET CHANGING EU LAW? 
 
A final consideration is whether the influence that EU law has on the Internet is 
reciprocal, i.e., whether the Internet is also changing EU law. The Internet forces 
legal systems to take account of what happens beyond their borders, and it is 
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possible that this engagement with developments in third countries can itself cause 
changes in EU law. 
In fact, there is evidence that this is already happening with regard to the role 
of the Court of Justice. The Court’s role is to serve as ‘the ultimate authority for 
deciding any question concerning the interpretation or validity of EU law’,210 and 
in theory it does not pass judgment on the law of third countries.211 In the 
interview he gave following the Schrems judgment, President Lenaerts stated about 
the judgment that ‘We are not judging the U.S. system here, we are judging the 
requirements of EU law in terms of the conditions to transfer data to third 
countries, whatever they be’.212 
However, it is surely disingenuous to claim that the Schrems case did not 
involve evaluation of third country legal standards. The judgment is based on an 
examination of US intelligence gathering practices and their effect on fundamental 
rights under EU data protection law,213 as can be seen, for example, in the Court’s 
mention of studies by the European Commission finding that US authorities were 
able to access data in ways that did not meet EU legal standards in areas such as 
purpose limitation, necessity, and proportionality.214 The need to review third 
country standards is logically inherent in an evaluation of whether a Commission 
decision based on those standards results in protection that is essentially 
equivalent to that under EU law. 
The need for the Court to review third country standards can also be seen in 
the opinions of Advocate General Bot in the Schrems case215 and Advocate General 
Mengozzi in Opinion 1/15216 (the latter case is based on a request for an opinion by 
the European Parliament concerning a draft agreement between the EU and 
Canada for the transfer of airline passenger name records). The opinion of 
Advocate General Bot contains an evaluation of questions of US law, such as 
whether limits on the supervisory powers of the US Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) allow it to be considered an ‘independent authority’ under EU legal 
standards.217 In Opinion 1/15, Advocate General Mengozzi indicated that some 
provisions of Canadian law had been brought before the Court,218 and that some 
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of the contentions of the parties required interpretation of issues of Canadian 
law.219 
In its Schrems judgment, the Court virtually ordered national courts to make 
preliminary references of cases involving the adequacy of data protection in third 
countries to it,220 so that there are likely to be an increasing number of such cases. 
Indeed, the Commission has indicated that in the future it will consider issuing 
additional adequacy decisions, including ones covering countries in regions such as 
East and South-East Asia that will pose difficult questions of comparison with EU 
law.221 In addition, Opinion 1/15 was not a preliminary reference but a request for 
an opinion submitted by the European Parliament under Article 218(11) TFEU, 
demonstrating the variety of cases in which the Court may need to deal with the 
law and legal standards of third countries. 
The increased rapidity and volume of international communications caused 
by the Internet has led to increased complexity of international disputes and a 
greater need to take foreign law into account when resolving them. It thus seems 
that the Internet is changing the role of the Court by leading it to evaluate foreign 
legal systems in the course of answering questions of EU law. It is not apparent 
what would prevent the Court from considering foreign legal standards when that 
is inherently necessary to resolve the issues of EU law before it, aside from its 
traditional avoidance of referring to comparative and international law in its 
judgments.222 Even if considering foreign legal standards goes beyond the Court’s 
traditional role, it is important that it be openly acknowledged so that its function 
can be properly understood. However, the implications of this change need not be 
exhaustively explored here; for the purposes of this chapter, the main point is that 
the Internet is causing changes to a key element of EU law, namely the role of the 
Court of Justice. 
The Internet is evolving rapidly, and the way that it interacts with EU law will 
no doubt change as well. At present, EU law has had significant influence on the 
Internet, but the Internet also poses a number of challenges for EU law. Thus, the 
story of the interrelationship between EU law and the Internet will continue to 
change to reflect both the values and interests of the EU, and nature of the 
Internet as a social, cultural, and legal phenomenon. 
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